@inproceedings{bf551135e992427fb741b6907b94514a,
title = "Study on the distribution in residual control right of accounting standards",
abstract = "Accounting standards is a kind of incomplete contract and its residual control right belongs to enterprises' stakeholders. Stakeholders participating in accounting policy choice (SPAPC) is a method of distribution in residual control right of accounting standards. The strategy choice among stakeholders is a process of repeated game. Stakeholders choose strategy on the basis of the present value of their benefit in the game and they may adjust the strategy according to others' choice. The strategy change speed is related to rate of stakeholders choosing the strategy initially. The state of Nash equilibrium means that all stakeholders can choose the accounting policy which can reflect enterprises' income status factually. In the process of SPAPC, stakeholders constrain with each other, which can avoid inefficiency of accounting policy choice and earnings manipulation of management. It's helpful to solve the matching problem between residual control right and residual claim right and decrease institution change cost of accounting standards.",
keywords = "Accounting standard, Earnings management, Residual claim right, Residual control right, Strategy",
author = "Sun, \{Ni Na\} and Wang, \{Fu Sheng\} and Song, \{Hai Xu\}",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1109/ICMSE.2009.5318036",
language = "英语",
isbn = "9781424439706",
series = "2009 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering - 16th Annual Conference Proceedings, ICMSE 2009",
pages = "1335--1340",
booktitle = "2009 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering - 16th Annual Conference Proceedings, ICMSE 2009",
note = "2009 16th International Conference on Management Science and Engineering, ICMSE 2009 ; Conference date: 14-09-2009 Through 16-09-2009",
}