Spectrum Trading Market Model

In this chapter, we study the economic issues of spectrum trading market, where unlicensed white space access devices (WSDs) lease under-utilized registered TV channels from TV licensees through the assistance of the white space database. Then the WSDs serve their subscribed end-user by using the leased registered TV channels. We first focus on end-users trading market and study how WSDs compete to provide services to end-users. We derive the Nash equilibrium in such a competition trading market and prove the uniqueness of this Nash equilibrium. We also show that the white space database can control the competition intensity among WSDs by adjusting the wholesale price charging from these devices. Then, we study the spectrum reservation strategy of a white space database, who faces stochastic demand. Our analysis shows that under the information asymmetry, the white space access device who possesses more information than the white space database would not be willing to share his private information truthfully. Then we propose a contract-based incentive mechanism to tackle the issue of effective information sharing and maximize the profits of both the white space database and the WSD.