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Multiradio channel allocation in multihop wireless networks

  • Lin Gao*
  • , Xinbing Wang
  • , Youyun Xu
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Shanghai Jiao Tong University
  • PLA University of Science and Technology

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Channel allocation was extensively investigated in the framework of cellular networks, but it was rarely studied in the wireless ad hoc networks, especially in the multihop networks. In this paper, we study the competitive multiradio multichannel allocation problem in multihop wireless networks in detail. We first analyze that the static noncooperative game and Nash equilibrium (NE) channel allocation scheme are not suitable for the multihop wireless networks. Thus, we model the channel allocation problem as a hybrid game involving both cooperative game and noncooperative game. Within a communication session, it is cooperative; and among sessions, it is noncooperative. We propose the min-max coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (MMCPNE) channel allocation scheme in the game, which aims to maximize the achieved data rates of communication sessions. We analyze the existence of MMCPNE and prove the necessary conditions for MMCPNE. Furthermore, we propose several algorithms that enable the selfish players to converge to MMCPNE. Simulation results show that MMCPNE outperforms NE and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) schemes in terms of the achieved data rates of multihop sessions and the throughput of whole networks due to cooperation gain.

Original languageEnglish
Article number4906996
Pages (from-to)1454-1468
Number of pages15
JournalIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Volume8
Issue number11
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2009
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Channel allocation
  • Game theory
  • Multiradio
  • Nash equilibria.

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