TY - GEN
T1 - Lightweight Transparent Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Cross-Domain Statements
AU - Tu, Zhengzhou
AU - Xie, Min
AU - Fang, Junbin
AU - Yu, Yong
AU - Jiang, Zoe L.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2026.
PY - 2026
Y1 - 2026
N2 - Commit-prove zero-knowledge proofs (CP-ZKP) efficiently validate cross domain statements spanning both algebraic and non-algebraic components, enabling applications like privacy-preserving credentials and confidential cryptocurrency audits based on standard signatures such as RSA or (EC)DSA. While existing CP-ZKPs using SNARKs offer advantages such as low communication overhead and fast verification, they require provers to perform group operations, such as exponentiation, that scales linearly with the statement size. This computational requirement can be challenging for resource-constrained environments like IoT. To address this, we present CPILC, a lightweight zero-knowledge proof tailored for cross-domain settings, achieving more efficient prover-side computations dominated with field multiplication, rather than group exponentiation, that scales linearly with the statement size. The verification is dominated with linear field additions, and the communication cost is sublinear. Specifically, we develop CPlink, a sub-proof of commitment equivalence, showing that a matrix of Pedersen commitment opens to a matrix of values committed in the ideal linear commitment model. Using the Fiat-Shamir transformation, we can compile CPlink and CPILC into non-interactive. Benchmark results demonstrate that CPILC reduces proving (verification) time by 59% (55%) for the cross-domain statement “∃(w,r):c=gwhr∧y=SHA256(w)”, with even greater efficiency gains as the algebraic component in the statement increases.
AB - Commit-prove zero-knowledge proofs (CP-ZKP) efficiently validate cross domain statements spanning both algebraic and non-algebraic components, enabling applications like privacy-preserving credentials and confidential cryptocurrency audits based on standard signatures such as RSA or (EC)DSA. While existing CP-ZKPs using SNARKs offer advantages such as low communication overhead and fast verification, they require provers to perform group operations, such as exponentiation, that scales linearly with the statement size. This computational requirement can be challenging for resource-constrained environments like IoT. To address this, we present CPILC, a lightweight zero-knowledge proof tailored for cross-domain settings, achieving more efficient prover-side computations dominated with field multiplication, rather than group exponentiation, that scales linearly with the statement size. The verification is dominated with linear field additions, and the communication cost is sublinear. Specifically, we develop CPlink, a sub-proof of commitment equivalence, showing that a matrix of Pedersen commitment opens to a matrix of values committed in the ideal linear commitment model. Using the Fiat-Shamir transformation, we can compile CPlink and CPILC into non-interactive. Benchmark results demonstrate that CPILC reduces proving (verification) time by 59% (55%) for the cross-domain statement “∃(w,r):c=gwhr∧y=SHA256(w)”, with even greater efficiency gains as the algebraic component in the statement increases.
KW - Commit-and-prove
KW - Cross-domain
KW - Ideal linear commitment
KW - Lightweight
KW - Zero-knowledge proof
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105021373934
U2 - 10.1007/978-981-95-3540-8_3
DO - 10.1007/978-981-95-3540-8_3
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:105021373934
SN - 9789819535392
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
SP - 40
EP - 61
BT - Information and Communications Security - 27th International Conference, ICICS 2025, Proceedings
A2 - Han, Jinguang
A2 - Xiang, Yang
A2 - Cheng, Guang
A2 - Susilo, Willy
A2 - Chen, Liquan
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 27th International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS 2025
Y2 - 29 October 2025 through 31 October 2025
ER -