Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

Gradient-Based Adversarial Attacks on Deep LiDAR Odometry

  • Zhenbo Song
  • , Xuanzhu Chen
  • , Zhenyuan Zhang
  • , Kaihao Zhang
  • , Jianfeng Lu*
  • , Weiqing Li
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Nanjing University of Science and Technology
  • School of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Adversarial attacks have been recently investigated in LiDAR perception problems for autonomous driving, where a small perturbation of source inputs can result in incorrect predictions. However, most previous studies focus on attacks on single-frame perception modules, lacking explorations of attacks on consecutive-frame tasks, i.e. the LiDAR odometry. In this paper, we propose a gradient optimization-based adversarial attack towards deep LiDAR odometry networks. To generate point clouds consistent with real-world scenarios, we constrain adversarial points within the range of a small object, e.g. a traffic cone, and render new points to simulate real LiDAR measurements. By incorporating such adversarial points in consecutive frames, we demonstrate a significant decrease in pose estimation accuracy of current popular LiDAR odometry networks. In addition, we also evaluate traditional geometric odometry approaches and report their robustness against adversarial points. Extensive experiments on the KITTI and Waymo datasets illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack method and the vulnerability of deep LiDAR odometry networks against adversarial points.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2025 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, ICRA 2025
EditorsChristian Ott, Henny Admoni, Sven Behnke, Stjepan Bogdan, Aude Bolopion, Youngjin Choi, Fanny Ficuciello, Nicholas Gans, Clement Gosselin, Kensuke Harada, Erdal Kayacan, H. Jin Kim, Stefan Leutenegger, Zhe Liu, Perla Maiolino, Lino Marques, Takamitsu Matsubara, Anastasia Mavromatti, Mark Minor, Jason O'Kane, Hae Won Park, Hae-Won Park, Ioannis Rekleitis, Federico Renda, Elisa Ricci, Laurel D. Riek, Lorenzo Sabattini, Shaojie Shen, Yu Sun, Pierre-Brice Wieber, Katsu Yamane, Jingjin Yu
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages15188-15194
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9798331541392
DOIs
StatePublished - 2025
Externally publishedYes
Event2025 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, ICRA 2025 - Atlanta, United States
Duration: 19 May 202523 May 2025

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation
ISSN (Print)1050-4729

Conference

Conference2025 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, ICRA 2025
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAtlanta
Period19/05/2523/05/25

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Gradient-Based Adversarial Attacks on Deep LiDAR Odometry'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this