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Follow-me: Deceiving Trackers with Fabricated Paths

  • Shengtao Lou
  • , Buyu Liu
  • , Jun Bao
  • , Jiajun Ding
  • , Jun Yu*
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks in which visually imperceptible perturbations can deceive CNN-based models. While current research on adversarial attacks in single object tracking exists, it overlooks a critical aspect of manipulating predicted trajectories to follow user-defined paths regardless of the actual location of the targeted object. To address this, we propose the very first white-box attack algorithm that is capable of deceiving victim trackers by compelling them to generate trajectories that adhere to predetermined counterfeit paths. Specifically, we focus on Siamese-based trackers as our victim models. Given an arbitrary counterfeit path, we first decompose it into discrete target locations in each frame, with the assumption of constant velocity. These locations are converted to heatmap anchors, which represent the offset of their location from the target object's location in the previous frame. Later on, we design a novel loss function to minimize the gap between above-mentioned anchors and our predicted ones. Finally, the gradients computed by such loss are used to update the original video, resulting in our adversarial video. To validate our ideas, we design three sets of counterfeit paths as well as novel evaluation metrics to measure the path-following properties. Experiments with two victim models on three publicly available datasets, OTB100, VOT2018, and VOT2016, demonstrate that our algorithm not only outperforms SOTA methods significantly under conventional evaluation metrics, e.g. 90% and 68.4% precision and successful rate drop on OTB100, but also follows the counterfeit paths well, which is beyond any existing attack methods. The source code is available at https://github.com/loushengtao/Follow-me.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMM 2023 - Proceedings of the 31st ACM International Conference on Multimedia
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages8808-8818
Number of pages11
ISBN (Electronic)9798400701085
DOIs
StatePublished - 27 Oct 2023
Externally publishedYes
Event31st ACM International Conference on Multimedia, MM 2023 - Ottawa, Canada
Duration: 29 Oct 20233 Nov 2023

Publication series

NameMM 2023 - Proceedings of the 31st ACM International Conference on Multimedia

Conference

Conference31st ACM International Conference on Multimedia, MM 2023
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityOttawa
Period29/10/233/11/23

Keywords

  • adversarial attack
  • visual object tracking

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