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Exploring Covert Third-party Identifiers through External Storage in the Android New Era

  • Zikan Dong
  • , Tianming Liu
  • , Jiapeng Deng
  • , Haoyu Wang*
  • , Li Li
  • , Minghui Yang
  • , Meng Wang
  • , Guosheng Xu*
  • , Guoai Xu
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
  • Monash University
  • Huazhong University of Science and Technology
  • Beihang University
  • OPPO
  • Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Third-party tracking plays a vital role in the mobile app ecosystem, which relies on identifiers to gather user data across multiple apps. In the early days of Android, tracking SDKs could effortlessly access non-resettable hardware identifiers for third-party tracking. However, as privacy concerns mounted, Google has progressively restricted device identifier usage through Android system updates. In the new era, tracking SDKs are only allowed to employ user-resettable identifiers which users can also opt out of, prompting SDKs to seek alternative methods for reliable user identification across apps. In this paper, we systematically explore the practice of third-party tracking SDKs covertly storing their own generated identifiers on external storage, thereby circumventing Android's identifier usage restriction and posing a considerable threat to user privacy. We devise an analysis pipeline for an extensive large-scale investigation of this phenomenon, leveraging kernel-level instrumentation and UI testing techniques to automate the recording of app file operations at runtime. Applying our pipeline to 8, 000 Android apps, we identified 17 third-party tracking SDKs that store identifiers on external storage. Our analysis reveals that these SDKs employ a range of storage techniques, including hidden files and attaching to existing media files, to make their identifiers more discreet and persistent. We also found that most SDKs lack adequate security measures, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of identifiers and enabling deliberate attacks. Furthermore, we examined the impact of Scoped Storage - Android's latest defense mechanism for external storage on these covert third-party identifiers, and proposed a viable exploit that breaches such a defense mechanism. Our work underscores the need for greater scrutiny of third-party tracking practices and better solutions to safeguard user privacy in the Android ecosystem.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium
PublisherUSENIX Association
Pages4535-4552
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9781939133441
StatePublished - 2024
Externally publishedYes
Event33rd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2024 - Philadelphia, United States
Duration: 14 Aug 202416 Aug 2024

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium

Conference

Conference33rd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2024
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPhiladelphia
Period14/08/2416/08/24

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