Evolutionary game analysis of government subsidies for reusable express packaging promotion

The increase in e-commerce and online shopping has resulted in a significant amount of packaging waste from express delivery, posing a considerable burden on the environment. To address this issue, reusable express packaging has emerged as one of potential solutions to reduce packaging waste in express delivery. This study analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy of local governments and express delivery enterprises by constructing an evolutionary game model. The model considers the limited rationality and group behavior of decision makers, as well as the economies of scale and diseconomies of scale in operating cost of reusable express packaging. Results indicate that the variability in the cost of reusable express packaging may lead to the simultaneous emergence of two evolutionary stability strategies, contrasting traditional evolutionary game studies. Due to the present low uptake of reusable express packaging among express companies, coupled with the lack of subsidies support from local governments, it is difficult to attain the optimal situation in which businesses actively utilize reusable express packaging. To accomplish this objective, it is crucial to establish subsidy amounts that are balanced and reasonable, rather than merely elevating them to the highest possible levels. The study proposes an optimal range for government subsidy levels and gives corresponding policy suggestions.