TY - GEN
T1 - Demand Response Decision Optimization for EV Aggregators in V2G Systems via Embedded-Crossed Graph Attention Reinforcement Learning
AU - Ruan, Mengxin
AU - Hua, Haochen
AU - Ma, Luyao
AU - Zhou, Yang
AU - Jiang, Yingjin
AU - Sidorov, Denis
AU - Gertrudes, João Bosco
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 IEEE.
PY - 2026
Y1 - 2026
N2 - With the increasing penetration of electric vehicles (EVs), vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology enables them to act as flexible resources within the power grid. Electric vehicle aggregators (EVAs) play a crucial role in coordinating largescale EV charging and discharging, yet they face the dual challenge of maximizing economic benefits of EVAs while maintaining user satisfaction. To address this issue, this paper develops a solution method based on Stackelberg game theory. As leaders, EVAs determine charging prices and V2G compensation to optimize profits and achieve peak shaving and valley filling, while users, as followers, respond to regulatory signals and adjust their charging behaviors accordingly. An embedded cross multi-agent actor-critic (EC-MAAC) algorithm is further proposed to address the scalability issues arising from large-scale EV participation in V2G systems, while alleviating the reliance of conventional game-theoretic solvers on convexity and differentiability assumptions for tractable equilibrium computation. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed EC-MAAC approach achieves a 15.1% reduction in EVA operating costs, a 44.6% increase in user rewards, and an improvement in SoC satisfaction from 91.2% to 96.8%, effectively balancing economic efficiency and user satisfaction.
AB - With the increasing penetration of electric vehicles (EVs), vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology enables them to act as flexible resources within the power grid. Electric vehicle aggregators (EVAs) play a crucial role in coordinating largescale EV charging and discharging, yet they face the dual challenge of maximizing economic benefits of EVAs while maintaining user satisfaction. To address this issue, this paper develops a solution method based on Stackelberg game theory. As leaders, EVAs determine charging prices and V2G compensation to optimize profits and achieve peak shaving and valley filling, while users, as followers, respond to regulatory signals and adjust their charging behaviors accordingly. An embedded cross multi-agent actor-critic (EC-MAAC) algorithm is further proposed to address the scalability issues arising from large-scale EV participation in V2G systems, while alleviating the reliance of conventional game-theoretic solvers on convexity and differentiability assumptions for tractable equilibrium computation. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed EC-MAAC approach achieves a 15.1% reduction in EVA operating costs, a 44.6% increase in user rewards, and an improvement in SoC satisfaction from 91.2% to 96.8%, effectively balancing economic efficiency and user satisfaction.
KW - - demand response
KW - electric vehicle aggregator
KW - graph attention
KW - multi-agent reinforcement learning
KW - vehicle-togrid
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105047320321
U2 - 10.1109/ICCA69928.2026.11617979
DO - 10.1109/ICCA69928.2026.11617979
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:105047320321
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA
SP - 624
EP - 629
BT - 2026 IEEE 20th International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA 2026
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 20th IEEE International Conference on Control and Automation, ICCA 2026
Y2 - 16 June 2026 through 19 June 2026
ER -