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Cooperative and non-cooperative WSPs in dynamic spectrum leasing

  • Ya Zhen Ren*
  • , Qin Yu Zhang
  • , Pei Pei Chen
  • *Corresponding author for this work
  • Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we study the interactions between two Secondary Wireless Service Providers (WSPs) in different situations: competitive and cooperative. WSPs acquire spectrum by leasing from spectrum broker and then sell spectrum to secondary users by providing services. Users follow Wardrop's principle and choose WSPs with lowest perceived price which is associated with price and quality of service (QoS). WSPs and users play a three-stage game to maximize their own profits. Assume the information about the WSPs and users are complete, we analyze the extensive form game by backward induction. After comparing with cooperative WSPs, We find that competitive WSPs have little less efficiency but more effectiveness and reality.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2011 3rd International Conference on Communications and Mobile Computing, CMC 2011
Pages274-277
Number of pages4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes
Event2011 3rd International Conference on Communications and Mobile Computing, CMC 2011 - Qingdao, China
Duration: 18 Apr 201120 Apr 2011

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2011 3rd International Conference on Communications and Mobile Computing, CMC 2011

Conference

Conference2011 3rd International Conference on Communications and Mobile Computing, CMC 2011
Country/TerritoryChina
CityQingdao
Period18/04/1120/04/11

Keywords

  • Dynamic spectrum access
  • Wardrop's principle
  • cooperative game
  • extensive form game

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