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Analysis of stakeholder participation in accounting policy choices as an evolutionary game

  • School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Solving conflicts in the process of decision-making and coordinating decision-makers' preferences is vital to improving the efficiency of business decisions. To improve cooperative and competitive relationships among stakeholders participating in micro-accounting policy choices, evolutionary game theory was adopted to analyze stakeholders' decision making processes. Analysis showed that the final decision was influenced by the initial state, and the initial state decision depended on the balance between benefits and costs for different decision options. Stakeholders compared the economic results from different accounting choices and then studied and adjusted their position to make a final decision. The study showed that equilibrium will be achieved on an accounting policy portfolio of risk and profit optimizing strategies when potential liabilities, including loss of reputation, are huge. Each side's interests will then be considered so that the resulting Nash Equilibrium maximizes enterprise value.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1451-1457
Number of pages7
JournalHarbin Gongcheng Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Harbin Engineering University
Volume30
Issue number12
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2009
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Accounting policy choice
  • Catastrophe
  • Decision-making
  • Dynamic replication
  • Evolutionary game
  • Stability
  • Stakeholder

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