TY - GEN
T1 - A Simple and Efficient Learning-Style Prompting for LLM Jailbreaking
AU - Luo, Xuan
AU - Wang, Yue
AU - He, Zefeng
AU - Tu, Geng
AU - Li, Jing
AU - Xu, Ruifeng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
©2026 Association for Computational Linguistics.
PY - 2026
Y1 - 2026
N2 - This study reveals a critical safety blind spot in modern LLMs: learning-style queries, which closely resemble ordinary educational questions, can reliably elicit harmful responses. The learning-style queries are constructed by a novel reframing paradigm: HILL (Hiding Intention by Learning from LLMs). The deterministic, model-agnostic reframing framework is composed of 4 conceptual components: 1) key concept, 2) exploratory transformation, 3) detail-oriented inquiry, and optionally 4) hypotheticality. Further, new metrics are introduced to thoroughly evaluate the efficiency and harmfulness of jailbreak methods. Experiments on the AdvBench dataset across a wide range of models demonstrate HILL’s strong generalizability. It achieves top attack success rates on the majority of models and across malicious categories while maintaining high efficiency with concise prompts. On the other hand, results of various defense methods show the robustness of HILL, with most defenses having mediocre effects or even increasing the attack success rates. In addition, the assessment of defenses on the constructed safe prompts reveals inherent limitations of LLMs’ safety mechanisms and flaws in the defense methods. This work exposes significant vulnerabilities of safety measures against learning-style elicitation, highlighting a critical challenge of fulfilling both helpfulness and safety alignments.
AB - This study reveals a critical safety blind spot in modern LLMs: learning-style queries, which closely resemble ordinary educational questions, can reliably elicit harmful responses. The learning-style queries are constructed by a novel reframing paradigm: HILL (Hiding Intention by Learning from LLMs). The deterministic, model-agnostic reframing framework is composed of 4 conceptual components: 1) key concept, 2) exploratory transformation, 3) detail-oriented inquiry, and optionally 4) hypotheticality. Further, new metrics are introduced to thoroughly evaluate the efficiency and harmfulness of jailbreak methods. Experiments on the AdvBench dataset across a wide range of models demonstrate HILL’s strong generalizability. It achieves top attack success rates on the majority of models and across malicious categories while maintaining high efficiency with concise prompts. On the other hand, results of various defense methods show the robustness of HILL, with most defenses having mediocre effects or even increasing the attack success rates. In addition, the assessment of defenses on the constructed safe prompts reveals inherent limitations of LLMs’ safety mechanisms and flaws in the defense methods. This work exposes significant vulnerabilities of safety measures against learning-style elicitation, highlighting a critical challenge of fulfilling both helpfulness and safety alignments.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105039092946
U2 - 10.18653/v1/2026.findings-eacl.124
DO - 10.18653/v1/2026.findings-eacl.124
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:105039092946
T3 - 19th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Findings of EACL 2026
SP - 2389
EP - 2406
BT - 19th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Findings of EACL 2026
PB - Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL)
T2 - 19th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Findings of EACL 2026
Y2 - 24 March 2026 through 29 March 2026
ER -