高峰期考虑乘客议价的网约车定价与平台收益及社会福利优化

Existing studies on dynamic pricing of online car-hailing mainly describe drivers' operating state from the perspective of drivers and platforms by the queuing theory, birth and death process, etc. However, the studies always pay little attention to the dynamic characteristics of market demand and ignore the independent bargaining of passengers. This paper formulates a dynamic matching model to describe the matching process between passengers and drivers in car-hailing markets by considering passenger independent bargaining. The model can capture the short-term fluctuations of car-hailing markets. The model uses demand and supply functions to describe the status of passengers and online car-hailing. Furthermore, this paper builds the platform profit optimal pricing model and the social welfare maximum pricing model. This paper puts forward the passenger bargaining influence factor and determines its function in different periods of market operation based on the existing data. We further incorporate the impact factor into the established models to revise the dynamic matching model and pricing model. This paper conducts numerical experiments to test the proposed model. The paper explores the effect of price changes on the market and analyzes the impact of passenger bargaining on the dynamic car-hailing market. Results of numerical examples show that social welfare, platform profit, and matching amount increase first and then decrease with the increase of the multiple of the price change factor. Social welfare reaches the maximum when the multiple of the price change factor is 2.0. The meeting rate reaches its maximum when the multiple of the price change factor is 1.3. Comparative analysis shows that passenger bargaining will promote the market to balance supply and demand and increase platform profits and social welfare during peak hours of the online car-hailing market.