绿色偏好视角下的绿色发展: 政府监管、企业转型与金融机构投资选择

Green development involves a wide range and covers a large range, so the difference in interest demands makes the government, enterprises and financial institutions unable to reach an effective consensus in the game. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model based on green preference perspective, and analyzes the relationships among green regulation, green transition, and green bond investment. The study found that the green preference of government, enterprises and financial institutions has different effects on green development. Enterprise green preference plays a decisive role in green transformation. Firstly, when the green preference of the enterprise is large, even if the government does not carry out green regulation or financial institutions do not invest in green bonds, the enterprise will still carry out green transformation production. However, when the green preference of other participants is not large enough, the phenomenon that the government makes green regulatory decisions but has no policy effect will occur. Secondly, when the size of the green preference of enterprises is in a specific range, while the green preference of financial institutions and the government is large, there are two possibilities: The simultaneous success or failure of green transition and green bond issuance. Finally, the main conclusions of this paper are verified by numerical simulation.